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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHAWNNA RAE COPE, Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY STATE COLLEGE, 
Appellee. 
UTAH VALLEY STATE COLLEGE, 
Cross-appellant, 
vs. 
JEFF K. PETERSON, 
Cross-appellee. 
Case No. 20110147 
UTAH VALLEY STATE COLLEGE'S ANSWER BRIEF ON APPEAL 
AND OPENING BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Utah Valley State College (UVSC) submits this Answer Brief on appeal 
and Opening Brief on cross-appeal. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
On Appeal: 
1. Summary J u d g m e n t 
Shawnna Cope and Jeff K Peterson, as part of UVSC's ballroom dance 
team, were practicing a routine that included a lift where the female dancers 
were lifted into the air by their male partners. Peterson had safely practiced 
the lift twenty to thirty times with different partners and had safely practiced 
the lift with Cope two times on the day of the accident and three times on a 
previous day. Peterson informed Scott Asbell, the dance team coach, that he 
was having difficulty performing the lift to match the other dancers. Asbell 
stated that the lift needed to be done correctly or it would be cut from the 
routine. Without asking for spotters or expressing any other concerns, Cope 
and Peterson then attempted the lift one more time. Peterson lost his footing 
and Cope was injured as she fell. By asking the couple to practice the lift 
again, did Asbell unreasonably increase the risk of injury beyond the inherent 
risks associated with ballroom dancing? 
2 
Standard of Review 
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 
Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, f 15, 250 R3d 56. 
Preservat ion 
UVSC raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment and 
supporting memoranda. R. 1047-90. * The district court addressed this issue 
in its memorandum decision entered January 18, 2011. R. 1356-61. 
2. R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of d e n i a l of s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t 
Based on counsel's realization that a video recording contained 
probative information that corrected the parties' mutual misapprehension of 
a material fact, UVSC asked the district court to reconsider its denial of 
UVSC's prior summary judgment motion. Undisputed evidence showed that 
Cope and Peterson had indeed practiced the lift together safely, and without 
spotters, on a day prior to the accident - contrary to the parties' mutual 
understanding at the time of the previous summary judgment motion. Given 
that the district court's prior ruling was based on an incorrect fact, did the 
1
 The record on appeal has been paginated irregularly. The page numbers 
within each document are numbered backwards. Accordingly, in the current 
citation, page 1090 is the first page of the document and page 1047 is the last. 
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district court act within its sound discretion to revisit the earlier ruling 
pursuant to Rule 54(b)? 
Standard of Review 
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider 
summary judgment is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not 
disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion/' Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 
1381, 1386 (Utah 1996) (emphasis omitted); accord Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah Ct. App 1994). 
Preservation 
UVSC filed a motion, with supporting memoranda, asking the district 
court to reconsider its prior summary judgment ruling. R. 1047-90. The 
district court addressed this issue in its memorandum decision entered 
January 18, 2011. R. 1356-61. 
Ofe^Cross-Appeal 
Preservat ion of r ight to recons ider Peterson's 
summary judj 
By taking this cross-appe^ljas UVSC precluded^the-priSfgrant of 
summary judgment to PetersonJrj £ase, so that the 
district court may entertain a motion to reconsider, in the event 
to file on£?sAlternatively, did the district court erroneously 
judgment to P e t e ^ n despite disputes of material fact£ 
seeks 
summary 
Standard of Review 
This issue is unique to this appearand therefore there is no standard of 
review. The alternative issiigrls reviewed de JWUQ. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, 
115, 250 R3d 56. 
Preservation o^fhe Issue 
The alternative issue was preserved by UVSC's joinder in Cbge's 
opposition to Peterson's motion for summary judgment. R. 728. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) states: 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving 
multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross 
claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
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an express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims 
or parties, and the order . . . is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shawnna Rae Cope sued Utah Valley State College (UVSC) for injuries 
she allegedly sustained when practicing as a member of UVSC's ballroom 
dance tour team. Cope fell while being lifted into the air by Peterson, who 
was also a member of the team. 
Course of the Proceed ings and Dispos i t ion Be low 
Cope sued UVSC alleging that it had negligently allowed the 
improperly trained students to engage in a dangerous dance lift without 
spotters or safety equipment. R. 1-7. After discovery, UVSC brought a third-
party complaint against Peterson, alleging that he had breached his duty as a 
responsible adult to exercise reasonable care in the executing the dance lift, 
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resulting in his dropping Cope and causing her injuries. R. 140-41. Cope 
then amended her complaint, naming both UVSC and Peterson as 
defendants, alleging that both had acted negligently. R. 159-66. 
UVSC filed a motion for summary judgment on causation and damages, 
issues unrelated to the present appeal. R. 254-81. That motion was denied. 
R. 324-25. 
Peterson filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he owed 
Cope no duty whatsoever. R. 329-714. Cope opposed that motion. R. 716-26. 
UVSC joined Cope in her opposition to the motion. R. 727-28. In an order 
dated September 25, 2009, the district court granted Peterson's motion, 
dismissing him from the case in an order, prepared by Peterson, that 
contained detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 744-47. Cope 
objected to the order because it did not accurately reflect the court's reasons 
for granting the motion. R. 750. The district court entered a minute order on 
September 28, 2009, striking the order entered September 25, 2009, and 
simply ordering, without elaboration, that "Peterson's motion for summary 
judgment is granted." R. 752. That order was never certified as a final 
judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
UVSC then filed a second motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
it owed Cope no duty of care because no special relationship existed between 
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Cope and UVSC. R. 753-86. On October 6, 2010, the district court denied 
this motion and set the case for a four-day jury trial to commence January 12, 
2011. R. 877-78, 881-82. 
On December 20, 2010, UVSC filed a Motion to Renew Second 
Summary Judgment and or in the Alternative Motion Purusant to URCP 
60(b) for Relief from Judgment. R. 1045-90. This motion was based on a 
discovery by UVSC's counsel, in preparation for trial, that a video that had 
been exchanged in initial disclosures showed Cope and Peterson had -
contrary to Cope's and Peterson's deposition testimony - practiced the lift 
together before the date of the injury. R. 1088-89. Because the district court 
had previously based, in part, its decision denying summary judgment on the 
fact that the date of the injury was the first day that Cope and Peterson had 
practiced the lift together, UVSC asked the district court to revisit and 
reconsider its earlier ruling. Id. 
Because the trial was only days away, the district court set a special 
hearing for January 3, 2011, to address the renewed motion for summary 
judgment and some trial-related matters. R. 1104, 1156-57. At the hearing, 
the district court noted that if Cope and Peterson had indeed practiced the lift 
together before the day of the injury, it could possibly be a "game changer" in 
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its prior analysis of whether a special relationship existed. Tr. 1/3/11 at 23.2 
Cope's counsel acknowledged that, assuming foundation could be laid for the 
video, the evidence should come in. Id. at 22, 24-25 ("if there's evidence to be 
had, then - then we should - should have it") ("I do need to have the 
foundation established"). Cope's counsel also expressed a desire to resolve the 
issue of special relationship - and whether it was impacted by the fact that 
Cope and Peterson had in fact practiced the lift together before the day of the 
injury - without having to incur the expense of a trial first. Id. at 22, 24-25 
("I don't necessarily want to go through a trial if, in fact, we're going to be 
overturned on appeal"; "if the Court is of the mind that this is going to change 
your opinion and they're going to get it in in trial, I - I'd just as soon have it 
done now and deal with it on appeal, than go through a very expensive trial"). 
The district court then struck the trial date that was nine days away 
and set the case for a hearing on January 12, 2011. Id. at 30. The hearing's 
purpose was not to have the court act as a fact-finder to resolve any disputed 
facts, but, in effect, to take depositions in open court to save the parties the 
additional delay and expense of conducting depositions to lay foundation for 
2
 This citation is to the hearing held January 3, 2011. The front page of the 
transcript is bates-stamped as R. 1397, but the individual pages within the volume 
are not numbered. The first page of the transcript from the hearing held January 
12, 2011, is bates-stamped as R. 1398, but its individual pages are likewise not 
numbered. 
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the video. Id. at 31 (Cope's counsel stating, "it will actually save me some 
money and I won't have to re-depose again . . . Til just essentially take the 
deposition in front of the Court"). 
At the January 12, 2011 hearing, UVSC laid foundation for the video. 
The parties also presented arguments to the district court regarding whether 
the renewed motion for summary judgment should be granted. Tr. 1/12/11 at 
38-68. 
The district court construed the renewed motion for summar}^ judgment 
as a Rule 54(b) motion to alter or amend its previous non-final order. 
R. 1361. The district court reversed its prior ruling, concluding that the 
undisputed fact that Cope and Peterson had danced together without incident 
before the accident showed that UVSC had not increased the risk of harm to 
Cope. R. 1356-57. The district court entered a memorandum decision on 
January 18, 2011, that constituted the final judgment in this case. 
R. 1356-61. 
Cope timely appealed on February 9, 2011. R. 1371. UVSC filed a 
timely notice of cross-appeal on February 23, 2011. R. 1376. The purpose of 
this conditional cross-appeal was to preserve UVSC's right to seek 
reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment to Peterson on two 
10 
grounds: the court's duty ruling was incorrect; and that decision was based 
on an incorrect material fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shawnna Cope was a member of the UVSC Ballroom Dance Tour Team. 
R. 6. Cope was injured on September 21, 2005, when she fell while being 
lifted by her dance partner, Jeff K. Peterson. Id. The lift was part of a 
choreographed dance routine. Id. Cope and Peterson both had experience 
with dance lifts. R. 1059 (Peterson had "danced for a number of years" and 
was "in the higher rankings of the members on the team"); R. 1066. Cope 
understood the type of lift involved in the routine she was rehearsing with 
Peterson, and that it involved the risk of injury from being dropped. R. 772. 
The lift, as choreographed, called for Peterson to lift Cope from his right 
side, across his body to the left shoulder. R. 1059. Peterson had been able to 
safely lift Cope and set her down on all previous attempts at the lift, even 
though in some of these attempts Peterson had lifted Cope to the wrong 
shoulder and on at least two attempts had lifted Cope to the correct shoulder 
but had been unable to maintain the hold, so he set her back down. R. 1057, 
1070. Before practicing with Cope, Peterson had only lifted to the correct 
shoulder one or two times. R. 1058-59. 
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In addition, Cope and Peterson had practiced the lift together on a 
previous day. R. 1162.3 UVSC submitted a video of them practicing the lift 
without spotters. Id. This video was filmed at least one day before the 
accident, and possibly five days before. Tr. 1/12/11 at 26. Peterson did not 
drop Cope on any of these previous attempts at the lift. In addition, Peterson 
had practiced this lift twenty to thirty times with other partners and had not 
dropped anyone. R. 1058. Beyond this specific routine, Peterson had 
extensive ballroom dance experience and had previously lifted dance partners 
on many occasions and had never dropped anyone to the floor. R. 1056. 
On the day of the accident, Peterson was unable to match the timing of 
the other dancers as they completed the lift, presumably because he was 
lifting to the wrong shoulder. R. 1057. Because several couples were unable 
to match the timing of the lift, Asbell had some of the couples practice the lift, 
one couple at a time, to improve the timing. Id. There were no spotters in 
position at the time of Cope's fall because she and Peterson had safely 
attempted the lift with Cope two previous times tha t day, as well as three 
times at the rehearsal shown on the video, and because Peterson had also 
3
 The citation here is to the mailing certificate that accompanied a DVD copy 
of the video recording. The DVD itself is in Volume IV of the record, attached to the 
front of the file in an unpaginated manila envelope marked, "060402485 - Cope vs. 
Utah Valley State College - Ballroom Dance Lift." All citations to the video will be 
to R. 1162. 
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safely lifted other partners in numerous previous attempts when not paired 
with Cope. R. 1058, 1162. Spotters had been used originally when the dance 
team had first learned the lift but were not used in subsequent days after the 
routine had been learned. R. 1058 ("When it was first choreographed, yes, we 
had spotters there helping us."); R. 1058 ("At the very beginning as we were 
choreographing we did have spotters."); Id. ("We learned it throughout the 
choreography and throughout the subsequent days just following it. We had 
rehearsed it and run it a good number of times. We had danced through it 20 
or 30 times I would say at least."). 
After Peterson practiced the lift, he informed Asbell that he had "never 
been able to get this lift well." R. 1057. Asbell responded, "Either you guys 
do it or we're going to cut this." R. 1068. Neither Peterson nor Cope asked to 
have the lift cut from the routine, and neither asked for spotters. R. 1056-57, 
1068. Peterson said he did not ask for spotters because he did not expect to 
lose his footing. R. 1056-57 ("I didn't think I would need to ask for spotters 
because I know that any time previous to that I was able to control the lift 
and sit her down."). Cope later testified that she did not want to cut the move 
because it was the "coolest" lift that they had been practicing. R. 1068. 
Asbell asked the dancers to practice the lift again. R. 1067-68. On this next 
attempt, Peterson lost his footing and Cope fell. R. 1056. Both Peterson and 
13 
Cope overcompensated in the amount of momentum they created in this 
attempt. R. 1054, 1055. Cope struck her head on Peterson's knee, allegedly 
causing her injury. R. 1056. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On Appeal: 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to UVSC 
because no special relationship existed between UVSC and Cope. By asking 
Cope to practice the lift again, Asbell did not unreasonably increase the risk 
of injury beyond the inherent risks associated with ballroom dancing. Asbell 
did not ignore a possible increase of risk to Cope because she had previously 
rehearsed with Peterson without injury or incident on at least one other day; 
the couple had safely attempted the lift twice already on the day of the injury; 
and Peterson had also successfully completed the choreographed lift and had 
run the dance 20 to 30 previous times with other partners without incident. 
Therefore, the level of risk assumed by Cope in practicing the lift one more 
time was not increased. The record further shows that Asbell did not 
unequivocally require Cope to continue attempting the lift. Instead, Asbell 
offered two alternatives: get the lift right or cut it from the routine. Without 
asking for spotters or expressing any other concerns, Cope and Peterson then 
attempted the lift one more time. Cope submitted no evidence that she had in 
fact surrendered her autonomy to Asbell or that anything else distinguished 
her from the other dancers, to the extent that a special relationship arose. 
15 
Based on counsel's realization that a video recording contained 
probative information that corrected the parties' mutual misapprehension of 
a material fact, UVSC asked the district court to reconsider its denial of 
UVSC's prior summary judgment motion. Undisputed evidence showed that 
Cope and Peterson had indeed practiced the lift together safely, and without 
spotters, on a day prior to the accident - contrary to the parties' mutual 
understanding at the time of the previous summary judgment motion. 
Regarding this corrected fact, Cope's counsel stipulated that, "if there's 
evidence to be had, then . . . we . . . should have it." Tr. 1/3/11 at 22. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in revisiting its prior ruling in light 
of this corrected fact. 
Cross-appeal: 
By taking this conditional cross-appeal, has UVSC precluded thejprior 
grant of summary judgifrGQt to Peterson from becoming law of^he case, so 
that the district court may entertain asa^tion to re^o^gider, in the event 
UVSC seeks to file one. The district courtjmprop®^ granted summary 
judgment despite the existenc^ofmaterial disputes of fact^Tl^se disputes 
included whetherJjaeeiiccident was caused by Peterson's acts or omissifrn^, or 
both. 
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ARGUMENT AS APPELLEE 
1. UVSC w a s ent i t led to summary judgment because no special 
relat ionship ex is ted b e t w e e n UVSC and Cope. 
Summary judgment standard 
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits establish no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130,113, 63 P.3d 705. The 
facts should be examined in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600. A plaintiff alleging 
negligence must establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Webb 
v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80, f 9, 125 P.3d 906. "The question of whether a 
duty exists is entirely a question of law to be determined by the court." Smith 
v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, f 14, 94 P.3d 919 (quoting Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149,151 (Utah 1989)). 
Discussion 
Generally, a state college or university does not owe its students a duty 
of care, even when a student is participating in a school-sponsored activity. 
Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f 19 ("general rule is that no special relationship exists 
17 
between a college and its own students because a college is not an insurer of 
the safety of its students."); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 
1986) (finding no special relationship existed where student became 
intoxicated and fell down cliff on off-campus, university-sponsored field trip).4 
But an the exception to the general rule exists if there is a special 
relationship. Utah courts use a policy-based approach to determine whether 
there is a special relationship. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
236-37 (Utah 1993). A special relationship may be established in four ways: 
(1) by a statute intended to protect a specific class of 
persons of which the plaintiff is a member from a particular type 
of harm; (2) when a government agent undertakes specific action 
to protect a person or property; (3) by governmental actions that 
reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the 
public; and (4) under certain circumstances, when the agency has 
actual custody of the plaintiff or of a third person who causes 
harm to the plaintiff. 
4
 This is also known as the public duty doctrine - government actors 
"are not accountable for their affirmative acts unless a special relationship is 
present." Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f 16 (citing Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, f 13, 
980 P.2d 1171). Webb confirmed that the public duty doctrine is not waived 
by the passage of Utah's new governmental immunity act in 2004. See Utah 
Code. Ann. § 63G-7-202(2) (West 2004) ("Nothing in this chapter may be 
construed as adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental 
entity or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law."). 
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Day, 1999 UT 46 at f 13.5 Of these four, Cope argues only that the third 
applies - that UVSC took action that reasonably induced Cope's detrimental 
reliance such that UVSC had a duty of care to Cope.6 
Because UVSC did not reasonably induce Cope's detrimental reliance, 
it did not have a special relationship with her and therefore owed her no duty 
of care. Cope can prevail only on her special relationship argument by 
drawing four unreasonable inferences that are not supported by the record: 
(1) that Asbell knew tha t Peterson was lifting to the wrong shoulder; (2) that 
there was an unreasonable increase in the danger of the lift if Peterson lifted 
to the correct shoulder; (3) tha t Asbell nevertheless requested that Cope 
subject herself to that increased danger; (4) and that Cope lacked sufficient 
autonomy to either decline the lift or ask for spotters or other safety 
5
 "[T]he commission of an affirmative act by a governmental actor does 
not lead directly to the duty question as it would in the case of a non-
governmental actor, but instead provides relevant information about whether 
a special relationship existed between the governmental actor and the injured 
party requiring the imposition of a legal duty on the governmental actor." 
Webb, 2005 UT 80 at ^14. Accordingly, even if UVSC committed an 
affirmative act, such as Asbell's requesting Cope to practice the lift, a special 
relationship is not necessarily established. 
6
 See Aplt. Brf. at 20-24. Cope has therefore waived any argument regarding 
the other three exceptions. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^[23, 16 P.3d 540 
(stating that, generally, any issues "that were not presented in the opening brief are 
considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court"); see also Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(5), (9). 
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measures. The district court correctly declined to draw any of these 
inferences, let alone all four of them, because the record supports none. The 
undisputed record evidence shows that Asbell was aware of a timing issue 
and therefore stopped the routine to have certain couples perform the lift, one 
couple at a time, to help them match the timing of the other couples. Asbell 
did not ignore a possible increase of risk to Cope because she had previously 
rehearsed with Peterson without injury or incident on at least one other day; 
and Peterson had also successfully completed the choreographed lift and had 
run the dance 20 to 30 previous times without incident. Therefore, the level 
of risk assumed by Cope was not increased. 
The record further shows that Asbell did not unequivocally require 
Cope to continue attempting the lift. Instead, Asbell offered two alternatives: 
Cope and Peterson could improve the timing and execution of the lift or the 
lift could be cut altogether from the routine. And Cope has submitted no 
evidence that she had in fact surrendered her autonomy to Asbell more than 
the other dancers. 
Furthermore, there is no record evidence to support an inference that 
Cope surrendered any autonomy to Asbell to the point that she was akin to a 
custodial ward of UVSC or Asbell. And such an inference would be 
unreasonable because it runs counter to the policy determinations set forth in 
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Webb and Beach. Webb held that it is "certainly possible that a directive 
inducing detrimental reliance may be one that creates an unreasonable risk 
of harm to the people expected to follow it" - and thus create a special 
relationship. Webb, 2005 UT 80, at f 27. But Asbell's conditional statement 
was not a directive. Nor did it induce detrimental reliance. And it did not 
create an unreasonable risk of harm. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
concluded that no special relationship existed between Cope and UVSC. 
Thus, UVSC owed no duty to Cope. 
Asbell did not increase the risk of harm or injury to Cope by requiring 
Peterson to attempt to execute the choreographed lift again. Peterson's 
general remark that he was not doing the lift well did not place Asbell on 
notice that an injury may occur. That Peterson was unable to match the 
timing of the other dancers because he was lifting to a different shoulder 
would not have necessarily given Asbell notice of an increased risk in 
practicing the lift - especially since falling is an inherent risk in any lift and 
that Peterson had safely lifted Cope and other dancers as many as thirty 
times in practices spanning multiple days. 
And, significantly, Cope presented no evidence beyond speculation that 
she had surrendered any of her autonomy to Asbell or that she could not, as 
an adult, otherwise assess the potential dangers of the lift as an adult and 
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request spotters if she felt threatened by the lift. Just as the student on the 
field trip in Beach failed to "distinguish her circumstances from those of the 
other students on the field trip," Cope has failed to distinguish her 
circumstances from those of the other dancers on the team. Beach, 726 P.2d 
at 416. Nothing in Asbell's statement can be inferred as a directive that 
Cope's success on the team "turned on whether [she] abandoned all internal 
signs of peril." Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f 27. It was unreasonable for Cope to 
rely on Asbell's statement as a directive that she abandon all self-assessment 
of the potential risks associated with performing a dance lift. 
Asbell's statement, like the instructor's statement in Webb, objectively 
falls far short of the "directive inducing detrimental reliance . . . that creates 
an unreasonable risk of harm to the people expected to follow it." Webb, 2005 
UT 80 at f 27. As the district court correctly noted, Asbell's conditional 
statement - that the dancers perform the lift correctly or the lift would be cut 
from the routine - shows that, like the instructor in Webb, Asbell did not 
"exert the control which might be present in an academic setting to create a 
special relationship." Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f 27. Even if Asbell knew far 
more than this record shows - for instance, that Peterson had a propensity to 
drop his dance partners - this would not necessarily be enough to establish a 
special relationship under Beach, where the court rejected the notion that any 
22 
special duty arose by reason of the university's knowledge of a student's 
propensity to become disoriented after drinking and therefore presumably in 
need of more protection than the other students on the field trip. Beach, 726 
P.2d at 416 (rejecting notion that "any special duty arose by reason of [this] 
knowledge"). 
Likewise, there is no evidence that Asbell denied any request by Cope 
for spotters or otherwise deprived her of the "normal opportunities for self-
protection" available to her and the other female dance team members. 
Beach, 726 P.2d at 415 (special relationship generally arises when one 
"deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection"). No 
evidence in the record establishes that Cope was precluded from asking for 
spotters, opting out of this lift, or even quitting this extra-curricular7 dance 
team altogether. Moreover, Peterson did not ask for spotters because he did 
not anticipate losing his footing and because on all previous attempts he had 
been able to control the lift and safely set Cope down. R. 1056. 
7Notably, the field trip in Beach was a requirement of a class. See 
Beach, 726 P.2d at 414 (class "required students to attend three one-day field 
trips and three weekend field trips"). Cope's participation on UVSC's dance 
tour team was not a required activity. In Beach, the plaintiff student was 
still required to distinguish herself from other students, all of whom were 
required to attend the field trip. 
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The undisputed record establishes that Asbell did not create a perilous 
environment. See Webb, 2005 UT 80 at fj[ 124-27 (noting that detrimental 
reliance could create a special relationship if the instructor alters the 
normally benign setting to create a perilous environment and gives the 
student directions related to the academic enterprise of the class). Practicing 
challenging techniques and performing lifts, where there is a chance of 
falling, are a normal part of a competitive ballroom dancing tour team. 
Therefore, even if Cope and Peterson were relying on AsbelFs direction, there 
was no detrimental reliance creating a special relationship because the 
environment was unaltered and had not become perilous. Any danger in the 
environment was an inherent part of the sport and the normal setting for a 
ballroom dance team. Cope and Peterson, both experienced ballroom dancers 
who had practiced this and other lifts previously, understood and voluntarily 
assumed the particular risks of harm inherent in ballroom dancing. 
Cope attempts to create a dispute of fact by asserting that Peterson had 
never completed the lift "successfully" or "correctly." But the undisputed fact 
supported by the record is that Peterson had safely lifted Cope and other 
dancers as many as thirty times before the accident. Whether the lift was 
"successful" would necessarily entail whether the lift matched the timing and 
movements of the other couples and is thus a subjective term capable of 
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different interpretations - and, hence, Cope obfuscates this issue to the point 
of claiming that Peterson's lifting Cope to a different shoulder actually 
constitutes a completely different lift. Aside from this word parsing, the 
record unequivocally shows that Peterson had safely lifted Cope every single 
time before the accident. These lifts included the lifts performed earlier that 
day as well as the videotaped practice that occurred on some day prior to the 
date of the accident and the twenty to thirty lifts Peterson had practiced with 
other partners. Moreover, the team was far enough along learning the 
routine that spotters were no longer being used in the videotaped practice, 
showing that the practice had occurred some time after the routine had 
initially been learned. 
The precise date of when this videotaped practice is not important 
beyond showing that a practice with Cope and Peterson paired together, and 
practicing without spotters, had occurred before the day of the accident. One 
witness testified that the video was filmed on the 15th or 16th of September, 
which was five or six days before the accident. On later questioning, the 
witness testified that he did not know for sure when the video was taken. 
Cope attempts to infer a factual dispute regarding the exact date the video of 
the previous practice was taken. UVSC concedes there may be factual 
disputes regarding this exact date, but that dispute is not material. What is 
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important - and undisputed - is that the video was filmed on a different day 
than the accident. This date had to be before the accident because Cope never 
danced this routine again after the accident. Therefore, regardless of exactly 
which day the video was shot, the video unequivocally established the 
following: 
-Peterson and Cope had danced together before and had safely 
completed the lift three times on that day without Cope falling; 
- the lift had been completed safely even if it had not been executed 
correctly to Peterson's left shoulder or to match the timing of the other 
dancers; and 
-spotters were not used in the video, showing that the video was not 
filmed while the lift was still being learned but after spotters were no longer 
being used. 
Accordingly, any dispute regarding the exact date would not have precluded 
the district court from granting summary judgment. Instead, the above 
undisputed information supports the district court's ultimate conclusion that 
the date of the accident was not the first day Peterson and Cope had practiced 
together. 
Cope also mistakenly draws an unreasonable inference regarding 
whether training was provided to the male dancers on how to cushion the fall 
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of a female dancer. Peterson was asked if he was thus trained, to which he 
replied, "Yes." Peterson then referred to the understanding among the 
dancers that the male partner must buy a steak dinner for the female partner 
if he drops her. The district court correctly construed Peterson's answer as an 
affirmative indication that he had been trained, followed by an additional 
answer regarding the custom of the steak dinner. To have construed the 
answer as Cope suggests would have been to ignore Peterson's "yes" answer 
and convert it into a "no." If in fact there had been no training given, 
Peterson would have answered "no," and then elaborated on the steak dinner 
custom. Cope's argument emphasizes the separate statement regarding the 
steak dinner and overlooks the "yes" answer before it. In any event, even if 
the steak dinner remark could lead to the inference that no training was 
given, Cope nevertheless assumed the risk by allowing herself- despite 
knowing there was no training - to be lifted by Peterson. 
Because there is limited Utah case law addressing whether a student-
athlete, such as a member of a ballroom dance team, is entitled to share a 
special relationship with its university or college, the district court properly 
turned to persuasive federal authority in its analysis. In Orr v. Brigham 
Young University, 960 F. Supp. 1522, 1531 (D. Utah 1994), affd. in 
unpublished opinion by Orr v. Brigham Young University, 108 F.3d 1388, 
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1997 WL 143600 (10th Cir. 1997), a federal district court examined Utah law 
to determine whether a special relationship existed between a university and 
a student-athlete on the football team. Applying Utah's policy-based 
approach, the federal court concluded that there are "no compelling reasons to 
impose upon colleges and universities additional duties beyond those owed to 
other students." Id. at 1529.8 
Other persuasive authority similarly offers guidance to this Court in 
making public policy determinations regarding college instructors and co-
participants in extracurricular athletic programs. See, e.g., Kahn v. E. Side 
Union High Sch. Dist, 75 P.3d 30, 32 (Cal. 2003). In Kahn, the court noted 
that when determining whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, a 
public policy analysis considers the inherent dangers in the sport, the 
conditions of the sport, and the relationship between the parties. Id. at 39. 
When the court applied this analysis to sport instructors, the court concluded 
that, like co-participants, instructors have only the duty not to increase the 
risk inherent in learning, practicing or performing the sport," not to eliminate 
8
 The court stated: "The court finds nothing different about a student-
athlete's relationship with a university which would justify the conclusion 
that a student athlete is a custodial ward of the university while the non-
athlete student is an emancipated a d u l t . . . . Voluntary association with a 
collegiate athletic team does not make the student less of 'an autonomous 
adult or the institution more a caretaker.'" Id. at 1529 (quoting Beach, 726 P 
.2d at 419 n.5.). 
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the inherent harms present in it. Id. "To impose a duty to mitigate the 
inherent risks of learning a [dance] by refraining from challenging a 
student. . . could have a chilling effect on the enterprise of teaching and 
learning skills that are necessary to the sport. At a competitive level, 
especially, this chilling effect is undesirable/' Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
Courts applied this doctrine to several types of activities and concluded 
that coaches, or instructors, were not liable for a student's injury because the 
students voluntarily assumed the inherent dangers of the activity. Crace v. 
Kent State Univ., 2009 WL 5108889, 2009-0hio-6898 (Ohio Ct. App.) 
(concluding that the cheerleading coach was not liable for injuries to a 
cheerleader); Rostai v. Neste Enter., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(finding that a personal trainer was not liable to a gym member participating 
in a training workout); Saville v. Sierra Coil., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 515 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that a peace officer training course instructor was not 
liable for a student's injuries); Rendline v. £>L Johns Univ., 735 N.Y.S.2d 173 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (granting summary judgment for the defendant when a 
cheerleader claimed the coach denied her request for a spotter and the 
cheerleader was subsequently injured when she fell during a lift); Bushnell v. 
Japanese-Am. Religious & Cultural Ctr., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996)(holding that a judo instructor was not liable for his student's injuries). 
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These cases all concluded that public policy and the students' voluntary 
actions demanded that the coaches or instructors not have any duty to protect 
the students from dangers that were inherent in the activities. In the present 
case, UVSC did not have a duty to protect Cope from harm that was inherent 
in competitive ballroom dancing. Lifting is an essential part of competitive 
ballroom dancing. Cope and her expert stated that there is a risk of falling 
when the ballroom dancers perform lifts. R. 755, 771, 772. These inherent 
risks are a part of ballroom dancing and UVSC's coach did nothing to increase 
the inherent risks, and performed his duty as a coach to encourage the 
participants to master difficult maneuvers. "That an instructor might ask a 
student to do more than the student can manage is an inherent risk of the 
activity." Bushnell, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d at 678. Cope and Peterson had both 
qualified through competition to become members of the ballroom dance tour 
team. To be members they had demonstrated a proficiency and 
competitiveness that made them stand out from other students. 
If UVSC had a duty to protect Cope and other dancers against the 
inherent risks of participating in a competitive ballroom dance setting it 
would "discourage instructors from requiring students to stretch, and thus to 
learn, and would have a generally deleterious effect on the sport as a whole." 
See id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(1 )(1979) (stating that 
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"[o]ne who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade [her] 
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm 
resulting from it"). 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly concluded 
that no special relationship existed between UVSC and Cope because UVSC 
did not increase the inherent risk of ballroom dancing. 
2. Reconsideration of summary judgment ruling 
Rule 54(b) governs a district court's reconsideration of a non-final order 
such as the district court's previous denial of summary judgment: "any 
order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order . . . is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Rule 54(b) allows "a 
[trial] court to change its position with respect to any order or decision before 
a final judgment has been rendered in the case." Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (emphasis added); see 
also U.P.C. Inc., v. R.O.A., 1999 UT App 303, f 56, 990 P.2d 945 ("Because a 
final judgment had not yet been rendered disposing of all of the parties' 
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claims . . . the court had the power to revise its summary judgment order 
under Rule 54(b)."); Rees v. Albertson's Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) (same); 
and Salt Lake City Corp. V. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating "Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior 
rulings in . . . cases . . . unless those rulings disposed of entire claims or 
parties and those rulings were specifically certified as finaP) (emphasis 
added). 
"In this case, the denial of the motion for summary judgment was not a 
final order. Thus, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude [the trial 
court] from revisiting [the] prior ruling." Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311. Cope's 
reliance on Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861, is misplaced. Gillett 
dealt with the circumstances under which the time to appeal from a final 
judgment would be tolled by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Gillett 
says nothing of interim orders being reconsidered under Rule 54(b). Gillett 
says nothing of the prior cases addressing reconsideration of non-final orders 
under Rule 54(b). Gillett does say that labeling a motion as one for 
reconsideration (regardless of what it is in substance) will not toll the time to 
appeal. But in all other respects, including a prior order being revisited 
under Rule 54(b), a district court still looks, as the district court appropriately 
did in this case, to the substance of the motion, not the caption. See Trembly, 
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884 P.2d at 1311. Cope is similarly mistaken in relying on the parameters of 
Rule 60(b), inasmuch as the district court correctly construed UVSC's motion 
not as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a final judgment, but as a Rule 54(b) 
motion for relief from a non-final order. 
UVSC was required to show a reason justifying revision of the prior 
order, and it did just that. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311 (a "litigant seeking 
revision and reversal must demonstrate a reason for the request"). UVSC 
met that burden when it came forward with the realization that all parties 
had previously relied on an incorrect fact - a critical fact regarding whether 
Cope and Peterson had practiced the lift together before the day of the injury. 
A sufficient reason to revisit a prior order can include presenting the matter 
in a "different light" or under "different circumstances." U.P.C., Inc. V. 
R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, f 58, 990 P.2d 945. Inasmuch as the 
video did present the matter in a new light, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in reconsidering the order in that new light. Timm u. Dewnsup, 
921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) (district court's decision on motion to reconsider 
summary judgment reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also, Trembly, 884 
P.2d at 1312 (same). 
Cope stated in sworn deposition testimony that she had rehearsed the 
dance routine with Peterson only on the day of the accident, and that she had 
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learned the dance the day before. Peterson swore in his deposition that this 
was the first time the two had danced together. Once UVSC discovered that 
the video proved that the deposition testimony was incorrect - and relevant 
and significant - UVSC immediately brought the matter to the district court's 
attention. UVSC's summary judgment motion had been denied because the 
Court found there was a question of disputed fact: Peterson's expression 
"that I am not getting this" placed Asbell on notice that Cope was at an 
increased risk of harm, thereby arguably establishing a special relationship. 
All parties believed at that time - though incorrectly - that Cope and 
Peterson had only rehearsed the lift on the day of the accident. 
The video shows Cope and Peterson practicing the routine at least 
three times and, most significantly, that they had in fact practiced together 
before the date of the accident, and possibly five days before. Moreover, this 
prior practice was without spotters, showing that the dancers were beyond 
the learning stage of the routine when spotters would have been used. And it 
disproves that Cope had only learned the lift the day before. This critical 
information, coupled with the fact that Peterson had safely practiced the lift 
twenty to thirty times with other partners, was directly relevant to the 
district court's prior conclusion. And because this conclusion was premised on 
incorrect information, the district court acted well within its discretion in 
34 
reconsidering its prior conclusion. Given the correct information that the 
couple had in fact safely practiced the lift together before, the district court 
correctly concluded that there was no reason for Asbell to worry that Peterson 
would drop Cope on the next attempt, beyond the normal risk of being 
dropped in a dance lift. The level of risk inherent in competitive ballroom 
dancing, and the risk assumed by Cope, was not increased. Thus, no special 
relationship was created. 
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion to reconsider 
and revisit its prior summary judgment ruling. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Theis&jie on cross-appeal is ripe only if this Court determines thatjfehe 
grant of summary judgijient in favor of UVSC should be reversec 
Accordingly, in the event this Cbm-t affirms the grant of summary judgment 
to UVSC, UVSC stipulates to the dismissal of the^etfoss-appeal. 
By taking this conditional cross-appeal, UYSC seeks to preclude 
Peterson's grant of summary judgrfient from becoming mw of the case in the 
event that UVSC's gran^ofsummary judgment is reversed. Tnlsswould allow 
the district cou£fe<fo entertain a motion to reconsider, in the event UVSSsWere 
to file one on remand. Normally, all interim orders are subsumed within a 
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final judgment and any such order not appealed from becomes the law of the 
case in a subsequent remand after appeal. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2ckl034 (1995). But a conditional cross-appeal of an adverse interim order 
is a legitimate way for UVSC to preserve issues and arguments/in the event 
that they bebome ripe again. See, e.g., Greenberg u. Commerce Bank, 2000 
WL 1174625, * m (10th Cir. 2000) (appellate court was ^ompelled to 
consider conditionai\ross-appeal because trial court's /decision not affirmed in 
all respects). Therefore/m the event that the final/judgment is reversed, and 
UVSC is reinstated as a party before the districtfcourt, UVSC asks this court 
to reverse the grant of summan judgment to/Peterson. 
The district court improperlys^rantefd summary judgment to Peterson 
because material disputes of fact existed regarding whether the accident was 
caused by Peterson's acts or omissions, orNboth. Both Peterson and Cope 
overcompensated in the lift by creating too m^ch momentum. R. 1055. This 
extra momentum caused Peterson to lose his balance. Id. Peterson then tried 
to break Cope's fall by placing his body underneath ner. R. 1067. It is not 
clear which of these/are acts and which are omissions. \ 
Whether a£ts or omissions caused the accident is significant to the 
district court's ability to determine duty. "In almost every i n s t a t e , an act 
carries *vith it a potential duty and resulting legal accountability for that act. 
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By contrast, an omission or failure to act can generally give rise to liability 
only ih the presence of some external circumstances - a special relationship." 
Webb, 2005 UT 80 at f 10. Because it is not clear from this record vvhether 
Peterson's abte or omissions caused the accident, or even whether the conduct 
of Cope herself cabled the accident, the district court could EK)t have 
definitively accept or rejected Peterson's argument that he owed Cope no duty 
of care whatsoever. Summaryjudgment therefore should not have been 
granted. \ / 
It is further unclear how responsibility should be allocated between 
Peterson and Cope for their respective ov^rieiompensating in attempting the 
lift. It is this potential allocation of fauhf that is of particular interest to 
UVSC. Peterson's dismissal in the face of disputed facts would deprive UVSC 
of an opportunity to have a jury decide how much fault should be allocated to 
Peterson. / \ 
In addition to the factual ambiguities in the record^he district court's 
order should be reversed^on public policy grounds. PetersonWas in control of 
Cope's body as he lifted her. Peterson knew more than anyone Vis own ability 
to do the lift and/whether he needed to request spotters. If a co-participant 
has no duty whatsoever, which is what Peterson argued below, then uTVSC is 
potentially left with strict liability for Peterson's conduct, a manifestly xmfair 
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Result. Better public policy would dictate that there should be at least some 
minnnal responsibility to act reasonably among team members. Peterson's 
argument is akin to absolute immunity and is too extreme. 
Furthermore, Peterson's grant of summary judgment was opposed, in 
part, on the incorrect fact that Cope and Peterson had not danced together 
before the day of the^accident. R. 821 (Peterson testifying that "this was the 
first day I had danced wit^i [Cope]"). That the two had in fact danced 
together before, may be relev^it to whether a duty should or should not be 
imposed. The district court did not elaborate on its reasons for granting 
summary judgment - whether it madesthe/sweeping conclusion that ballroom 
dancers have no duty of care whatsoever oXwhether there was no duty under 
these circumstances, where it was nnstakenly Believed that the couple had 
not danced together before. At the very least, the ctistrict court should be 
directed to reconsider its prior ruling in light of the fac^ that Cope and 
Peterson did in fact practice together before. 
Accordingly, U /SC requests that this Court reverse theNiistrict court's 
grant of summary/to Peterson with instructions to reconsider Peterson's 
summary judgment motion in light of the fact that Peterson and Copei^ad in 
fact practiced together before, and in light of the negative public policy 
implications of relieving a male dance partner of all responsibility to exercise 
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reasonable care. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to UVSC 
because no special relationship existed between UVSC and Cope. UVSC did 
not increase the risk of injury beyond the inherent risks associated with 
ballroom dancing. Asbell did not ignore a possible increase of risk to Cope 
because she had previously rehearsed with Peterson without injury on a 
previous day; the couple had safely attempted the lift twice already on the 
day of the accident; and Peterson had also safely completed the lift numerous 
times with other partners. In reconsidering its prior order of summary 
judgment, the district court acted well within its discretion when it learned 
that all the parties had relied on incorrect information. 
In the event UVSC's conditional cross-appeal becomes ripe, the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to Peterson should be reversed because 
factual disputes exist and better public policy would dictate that there should 
be at least some minimal responsibility to act reasonably among team 
members. 
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Addendum: 
Memorandum Decision entered January 18, 2011 
(R. 1356-61) 
P«LEO 
jM 1Q 2011 
-toss,*® 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAWNNA RAY COPE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY STATE COLLEGE , 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 060402485 
Judge SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
Defendant Utah Valley State College (UUVSC") filed a motion for summary judgment 
on July 29, 2010 arguing it had no duty to provide spotters to prevent a dance injury to plaintiff, 
Shawnna Ray Cope. Ms. Cope had been dropped by a fellow dance team member during a 
rehearsal for the UVSC competitive dance team. The Court denied the motion on the ground that 
disputed issues of material fact would require jury resolution on the question of whether UVSC 
breached a duty arising out of a special relationship between it and Ms. Cope. The Court's 
concern rested , among other things, on testimony that there had been only limited rehearsals 
between Ms. Cope and her partner, Mr. Peterson, on the day of the accident. 
UVSC recently renewed its motion, in essence, by asking the court to reconsider its 
earlier ruling; in reviewing the videotape of the dance routine previously submitted in connection 
with the motion for summary judgment, UVSC's counsel discovered Cope and her partner had 
actually rehearsed the dance together on a prior date. Thus, the couple had a more extended 
history of practice together than indicated in connection with the earlier motion. This new 
information would show, in part, UVSC had not increased the risk inherent in competitive 
dancing. 
Although the motion was purportedly brought under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court considers it to be really a motion to reconsider the previous non-final order 
based on the recent recognition of the couple dancing together on a prior occasion. There was a 
dispute over the date the video was filmed since there no foundation it had been made on a date 
before the accident. When the Court first viewed the video, it appears everyone assumed it was 
taken the day of the accident. The Court allowed the parties to present testimony to establish a 
foundation for the date the video was taken. Although Cope's counsel raised an objection to 
taking evidence at the January 12, 2011 evidentiary hearing, he expressly agreed to proceeding in 
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thus waived any objection to the proceeding. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, it was undisputed the video was taken the week 
before September 21, 2005— the date on which Ms. Cope was injured. The video showed a 
rehearsal sometime late in the week of September 12,2005 and showed Ms. Cope and Mr. 
Peterson performing the dance routine, albeit incorrectly, on three separate occasions. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
It is undisputed Ms. Cope and Mr. Peterson were members of the UVSC competitive 
dance team. During a rehearsal on September 21, 2010 Ms. Cope was injured when she slipped 
from Mr. Peterson's grasp while they performed a lift. Mr. Scott Asbell, a UVSC employee, was 
the team coach. He was supervising the rehearsal when Ms. Cope was injured. 
The particular lift being rehearsed required Mr. Peterson to raise Ms. Cope to his left 
shoulder from where she was standing on his right side. Thus, he had to lift her across his body 
from right to left. Ms. Cope had to execute a kick to help with momentum for the lift. The 
couple had never completed the lift correctly. They had always done the lift to the right shoulder. 
Mr. Peterson practiced the routine before with other partners but only correctly completed 
the lift one or two times previously with them. Ms. Cope previously testified in a deposition that 
the date of the injury was the first time she had danced with Mr. Peterson. She did have prior 
experience with dance lifts but stated she had no knowledge of Mr. Peterson's prior experience 
and had no prior experience dancing with Mr. Peterson. The video demonstrates she was 
mistaken and performed the lift with Peterson the week before, which may be understandable 
considering her head injury. 
She had in fact practiced with Mr. Peterson the week before and they performed three lifts 
together, although all of them were to the wrong shoulder. The lift to the right shoulder is less 
difficult and requires a lesser application of strength than does the cross-body lift to the left 
shoulder. She was aware of an inherent risk of falling in dance moves. Of note, the male dancer 
is actually instructed how to cushion the fall of the woman, as Mr. Peterson testified. After 
watching the video and taking into account there is actual training for the male in breaking a fall, 
the Court is convinced any reasonable person would be aware of a risk of falling in these highly 
athletic dance routines. 
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On the date of the injury, the couple performed the lift to the right shoulder on two or 
three occasions. Mr. Asbell stopped the practice and had some couples demonstrate the lift. He 
worked individually with each couple. Mr. Peterson expressed to Coach Asbell he had never 
been able to do the lift well, or according to Ms. Cope, did not know how to do the lift over the 
left shoulder. Mr. Asbell then told them to just do it as it was the same thing. They tried it again 
incorrectly. Mr. Asbell, according to Ms. Cope, then said, "either you guys do this or we are 
going to cut it," meaning cut the lift from the routine. Ms. Cope testified it was the "coolest" 
move in the whole dance. Mr. Asbell then said, "Shawnna [Ms. Cope],you just need to kick. 
Jeff, [Mr. Peterson] you need to push more or lift more." The couple tried it again, Mr. Peterson 
lost his footing during the move and Ms. Cope fell, striking her head on Mr. Peterson's knee. 
Mr. Asbell did not direct any spotters to participate in the move. Mr. Asbell believed because 
the couple was able to perform the lift "successfully," though not "correctly," there was no 
safety concern sufficient to require using spotters. 
STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary Judgment may be entered if the evidence presented by the parties shows "there 
is no dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56(c). 
TRIAL COURT STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DUTY 
"[T]he question of whether a duty of care exists is entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the court," Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, % 8, 67 P.3d 1017; 
mA duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give 
recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.'" AMS v. 
Salt Indust.y 942 P.2d at 320-21 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser andKeeton on the Law 
of Torts § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984)). A court determines whether a duty exists by analyzing the 
legal relationship between the parties, the foreseeability:of injury, the likelihood of injury, public 
policy as to which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general policy 
considerations. Id. at 321. "Legal duty, then, is the product of policy judgments applied to 
relationships." Yazdv. Woodside Homes, Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 17, 143P.3d283. The issue is 
"heavily fact sensitive " (id. at 14). 
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DUTY OF A STATE COLLEGE TO STUDENTS 
This Court does not get involved in policy judgments as a general rule but the Utah 
Supreme Court is vested with such authority. See Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, [^9 
125 P.3d 906, 909. Accordingly the Supreme Court has defined how to determine whether a 
duty is owed by a university to students. The analysis would include application when students 
participate in extracurricular activities like teams, as with Ms. Cope. 
In Webb, a student fell on an icy sidewalk while on a university-sponsored field trip. A 
professor told the student to use the sidewalk to get to a class activity involving viewing 
geological faults. The student sued the universtiy for negligence. 
The court noted a special relationship is a necessary predicate to creating a duty for a 
governmental actor, id. at \ 13. Further, when the actor is a college, "[ujniversity personnel do 
not generally have a special relationship with students." Id. at \\9 (citation omitted). However, 
it is possible for an instructor to create a special relationship by altering the academic 
environment, id. at [^23. The parties agree that in this case, such a special relationship would be 
produced by "governmental actions that reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of 
the public," which is the third special relationship option enunciated in the case of Day v. State, 
1999 UT 46, T|13, 980 P.2d 1171. Thus, if Mr. Asbell issued a directive in connection with an 
assignment it may be an act which would induce detrimental reliance in a student such as Ms. 
Cope because a reasonable perception of the directive might be that it was compulsory and take 
away her autonomy to exercise caution. If the directive induced detrimental reliance that created 
an unreasonable risk of harm to people expected to follow it, it could create a duty of care. Id. at 
IP6-27. The question is therefore whether Mr. AsbelPs indication to Ms. Cope to perform the 
dance move again created an increased risk of peril and made such an impression on Ms. Cope as 
to cause her reasonably to abandon a sense of caution and perform the move with Mr. Peterson 
and without spotters. {See id.) In other words, did Mr. Asbell as the instructor or coach exert the 
control which might be present in this setting to create a special relationship? Id. If he did, the 
question of breaching the duty by not providing spotters could survive the motion, 
ANALYSIS 
UVSC cited to Orr v. Brigham Young University, 960 F.Supp. 1522 (D. Utah 1994), affd 
without pub. opin., 1997 WL 143600 (10th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that its facts are so 
similar to those in this case, the Court should find it persuasive on the issue of duty of care. Orr 
involved a college football player whom a coach ordered to practice even though the coach knew 
he had back pain. He was later diagnosed with three herniated discs. (Id. at 1524.) The federal 
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district court in Utah found Orr was an emancipated adult who could appreciate how to watch out 
for danger and thus was not some custodial ward of the university. (Id. at 1528.) There was no 
compelling reason to impose a different relationship between colleges and student-athletes than 
on colleges and students not involved in athletics. There was no special relationship. (Id. at 
1528-29.) 
The Court notes Orr predated Webb and according to Shepherd's has never been cited by 
the Utah Supreme Court, including in Webb. Webb goes beyond the mere analysis of a custodial 
relationship and looks at defining a special relationship in terms of whether an instructor 
directive exerts the control necessary to induce detrimental reliance to the extent it "creates an 
unreasonable risk of harm to the people expected to follow it." Webb, supra, 2005 UT 80, [^18. 
UVSC also relies on Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) in which a 
student on a field trip got drunk and fell off a cliff The court there found no duty owed to the 
student, but that case is distinguishable because there was no claim of a directive or even an 
omission where the university would have increased an environment of peril. 
In its previous ruling on UVSC's motion for summary judgment the Court was of the 
opinion there was an issue whether Ms. Cope's will was overcome given the circumstances and 
Mr. Asbell thus made the environment more dangerous by not calling for spotters. Thus, there . 
were facts which could support a duty. Now knowing Ms. Cope had practiced the dance move 
with Mr. Peterson at least three times the week before, when combined with the following 
undisputed facts from Ms. Cope's testimony, causes a different outcome: 
1. Ms. Cope was aware-she and Mr. Peterson were not performing the move 
correctly on the date of the injury and, as noted above, knew they had a history of 
problems with the lift dating back nearly a week. 
2. Ms. Cope heard Mr. Peterson express to Mr. Asbell he were not able to do the 
move. 
3. Mr. Asbell then made the statement, "either you guys do this or we are going to 
cut it." Ms. Cope did not object to doing the "cool" move. 
4. After receiving guidance on what they had to do to complete the move correctly, 
Ms. Cope and Mr. Peterson tried again resulting in the fall. 
5 
f \ n 4 
First, even taking all inferences in Ms. Cope's favor as the non-moving party, the Court 
simply cannot construe Mr. Asbell's statement as a directive in light of its terms being in the 
alternative and the fact the couple had been performing the dance move, albeit incorrectly, for 
nearly a week. Asbell expressly gave them an option of either completing the lift or he would 
simply cut it from the routine. In light of the background facts, this cannot be construed as a 
directive to participate in a more perilous activity but was rather an option to do it or not. There 
was no threat of Ms. Cope being cut from the dance team or even from the routine's performance 
if she failed to try the lift again. Mr. Asbell simply offered to remove the lift from the 
performance. 
Ms. Cope thought the lift was the "coolest" part of the routine; had several days to reflect 
on the difficulty of the move, the failure to complete it correctly and the inherent risk; was aware 
of the inherent risk attempting a dance lift; and selected the option of trying the lift again. Based 
on these considerations and on the guidance of Webb, the court cannot conclude UVSC induced 
detrimental reliance creating a greater risk of peril than existed otherwise. Accordingly, the court 
cannot find a special relationship giving rise to the duty of care running from UVSC to Ms. 
Cope. 
The court is well aware of the sympathetic nature of Ms. Cope's condition as expressed 
by her counsel. However, the Court must follow the law and, finding no duty, must dismiss the 
case for no cause of action. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, this matter is dismissed with prejudice. No further order is 
necessary to implement this ruling. 
Dated this 14th day of January, 2011 
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